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154 Abstract
The paper analyzes the fiscal effects of a Swiss-type tax on household wealth, with 
a $120,000 exemption and marginal tax rates running from 0.05 to 0.3 percent on 
$2.4 million or more of wealth. It also considers a wealth tax proposed by Senator 
Elizabeth Warren with a $50 million exemption, a 2 percent tax on wealth above 
that and a 1 percent surcharge on wealth above $1 billion. Based on the 2016 
Survey of Consumer Finances, the Swiss tax would yield $189.3 billion and the 
Warren tax $303.4 billion. Only 0.07 percent of households would pay the Warren 
tax, compared to 44.3 percent for the Swiss tax. The Swiss tax would have a very 
small effect on income inequality, lowering the post-tax Gini coefficient by 0.004 
Gini points. The effect of the Swiss tax and Warren tax on wealth inequality is 
miniscule, lowering the Gini coefficient by at most 0.0005 Gini points. 
Keywords: household wealth, income inequality, wealth inequality, wealth taxa-
tion, United States
1 INTRODUCTION
Both the extreme nature of wealth concentration in the United States (U.S.) and its 
rise in recent years provide some urgency to a consideration of potential policy 
remedies. Personal wealth is currently taxed in two ways on the federal level in 
the United States: realized capital gains (as part of personal income taxes) and 
estate taxation. Should we also think about direct taxation of the wealth holdings 
of households? Almost a dozen European countries have or have had such a sys-
tem in place (see Table 1 and Table 2 below). On the grounds of equity, a combina-
tion of annual income and the current stock of wealth provides a better gauge of 
real living standards and thereby the ability to pay taxes than income alone. More-
over, there does not appear to be any evidence from other advanced economies 
that the imposition of a modest direct tax on household wealth had any deleterious 
effect on personal savings or overall economic growth. Indeed, there are argu-
ments to the contrary that such a tax may induce a more efficient allocation of 
household wealth, away from unproductive toward more productive uses. 
In Wolff (1995), I proposed a very modest tax on wealth (a $100,000 exemption 
with marginal tax rates running from 0.05 to 0.3 percent). My calculations for year 
1989 showed that such a tax structure would yield an average tax rate on house-
hold wealth of 0.2 percent, which is less than the loading fee on most mutual 
funds, and would reduce the average yield on household wealth by only 6 percent. 
Even the top marginal tax rate of 0.3 percent would reduce the average yield on 
personal wealth by only 9 percent. These figures suggested that disincentive 
effects on personal savings would be very modest. Moreover, there are arguments 
to the contrary as suggested above that personal savings might actually rise.
I estimated that such a tax could raise $50 billion in additional revenue and have 
a minimal impact on the tax bills of 90 percent of American families. This is not a 
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155However, on the margin such additional revenue could help provide the fiscal 
latitude to enact more generous social transfers to the poor and provide needed tax 
relief to the middle class.
This paper begins, in Section 2, with an overview of wealth taxation in the mid-
1980s, Section 3 provides estimates of the impact of wealth taxes in the United 
States in 2016. Section 4 includes an analysis of the wealth tax proposed by Eliza-
beth Warren. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
2 PREAMBLE: SYSTEMS OF WEALTH TAXATION, MID-1980s
2.1 THE UNITED STATES
It is helpful to start with an historical overview of wealth taxation in advanced 
economies to see how this has devolved over time. I first summarize the forms of 
wealth taxation in place in the United States and other industrialized countries 
around 1985. In the United States, household wealth was (and is currently) taxed 
in two ways on the federal level: estate taxes and capital gains taxes. Federal 
estate taxes were first introduced in 1916, with major revisions in 1976, 1981, and 
more recently, a big overhaul in 2011. Capital gains were originally included in 
the personal income tax system, introduced into the country in 1913. Their provi-
sions have been modified over time on a recurrent basis.1 
The system in 1985 (and currently) provides for the taxation of the value of an 
estate at the time of death of an individual. The tax is levied on the value of the 
estate, in contrast to the value of an inheritance received. Moreover, the estate tax 
system is integrated with the gift tax, which refers to the voluntary transfer of assets 
from one (living) individual to another. Gifts are aggregated over the lifetime of the 
individual donor, and the lifetime aggregate of gifts is combined with the value of 
an estate at death. The estate tax applies to the full value of gifts and estates.2 
In February of 2001, each individual was exempted from estate taxes on net worth 
up to $675,000. The basic exemption rose to $1 million in 2006. Wealth above that 
amount was taxed at marginal rates, which began at 37 percent and reached as 
high as 55 percent (for estates over $3.67 million). Estates of fewer than 48,000 
individuals – about 2 percent of annual deaths – were subject to the estate tax. 
About half the total was paid out of estates worth $5 million or more – about 4,000 
people. In 2016, the exemption on the estate tax was raised to $5.25 million for 
singles and $10.5 million for couples and the top marginal tax rate was 40 percent, 
up from 35 percent in 2012. The exemption level is now indexed to the consumer 
price index (CPI-U).
1 A related tax is the property tax, levied on the value of all real property (buildings and land). Though this is 
often overlooked in current debates on tax reforms, the property tax was the third-largest source of household 
tax revenue in 1985 and has been rising steeply in years since then. This tax is generally levied by local gov-
ernments in the United States and, as a result, will not be discussed in this paper. Of the twenty-four members 
of the OECD, all but Italy and Portugal had a separate tax on real property in the mid-1980s.
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156 For gifts, the first $10,000 per recipient ($20,000 in the case of a married couple) 
was exempt from the combined gift-estate tax. In 2016 the figure was $14,000. 
There was (and is) also full exemption for transfers (both gifts and estates) between 
spouses. All forms of wealth are included in the tax base for calculating the gift-
estate tax except pension annuities and life insurance. Assets are appraised at mar-
ket value at time of death, though special rules apply to farm property, closely held 
business, and unquoted stock and shares. Several states also levy estate taxes, 
which are generally based on federal rules.
Capital gains refer to the difference between the selling price and purchase price 
of an asset. There are some adjustments made for the value of capital improve-
ments in the case of real property (such as a home). These are figured in on a cost 
basis when computing capital gains. In the United States, capital gains are taxed 
as part of the federal income tax system (and state income tax systems). Only real-
ized capital gains are included (that is, capital gains on actual sales of assets). 
In 2001, capital gains on assets held more than five years were subject to a maxi-
mum tax of 18 percent (compared to the top marginal tax rate of 39.6 percent). In 
2016, the maximum tax rate on long-term capital gains was 20 percent (also com-
pared to the top marginal tax rate of 39.6 percent). Short-term capital gains are 
treated as ordinary income and do not receive tax preference. However, in the case 
of owner-occupied housing, there was no tax levied on capital gains in the case 
when a new primary residence was purchased whose price exceeds the selling 
price of the old home. There was also a one-time exclusion of $500,000 in capital 
gains on the primary residence. Capital gains on assets that enter an estate at time 
of death are exempt from taxation.
2.2 OTHER OECD COUNTRIES
Other member countries of the OECD have had much more extensive taxation of 
household wealth.3 Besides taxation of estates at death and of capital gains, many 
countries also imposed direct taxation on household wealth.
In 1985, eleven OECD countries had systems in place with direct taxation of 
household wealth: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (see Table 1). In addition, France 
had such a system in place from 1982 to 1987 and Ireland from 1975 to 1977.4 Also, 
with the exception of Spain, most of these systems had been in place for at least 
sixty years. In all eleven countries, the wealth tax was administered in conjunction 
with the personal income tax. In all cases, except Germany, a joint tax return was 
filed for both income and wealth. Though actual provisions varied among these 
eleven countries, the basic structure of the tax was very similar in each.
3 Most of the information in this section was garnered from the OECD (1988). The figures in this section are 
as of 1988 in most cases.
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157Table 1




Transfer tax at 





and gift tax 
receipts as % of 
total tax revenuea
Australia no none income 0.01
Austria yes inheritance none 0.51
Belgium no inheritance none 0.58
Canada no none income 0.03
Denmark yes inheritance separate 0.92
Finland yes inheritance income 0.50
France 1982-87 inheritance income 0.85
Germany yes inheritance none 0.42
Greece no inheritance none 0.94
Iceland yes inheritance income –
Ireland 1975-77 inheritance separate 0.30
Italy no estate/inheritance none 0.23
Japan no inheritance income 1.19
Luxembourg yes inheritance income 0.51
Netherlands yes inheritance none 0.94
New Zealand no estate none 0.19
Norway yes inheritance income 0.61
Portugal no inheritance none 0.83
Spain yes inheritance income 0.49
Sweden yes inheritance income 0.68
Switzerland yes estate/inheritance income 3.06
Turkey no inheritance income 0.19
UK no estate none 0.64
United States no estate income 0.77
Note: aFigures are for 1985.
Source: OECD (1988).
Countries differed in terms of the level at which the wealth tax took effect. The 
thresholds for married couples with two children ranged from a low of $9,000 in 
Luxembourg to a high of $155,000 in Denmark. In Germany, the threshold was 
$129,000; in the Netherlands, $51,000; and in France, it was (when the tax was in 
effect) $520,000. These threshold levels did not include the forms of wealth that 
are entirely excluded from the tax base (see below). Moreover, there were income 
exclusions in many countries, so that a joint income-wealth threshold must be 
passed in order for the wealth tax to become effective.
In several countries (such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden), there were 
also ceilings on the total amount payable in both income and wealth taxes com-
bined. These ceilings were usually expressed as a percentage of taxable income 
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158 Tax rates on household wealth tended to be quite low, in the order of a few percent 
at most. Five countries had a flat rate system: Austria (1.0 percent), Denmark (2.2 
percent), Germany (0.5 percent), Luxembourg (0.5 percent), and the Netherlands 
(0.8 percent). The other countries had graduated marginal tax rates: Finland (1.5 
percent at the threshold, rising to 1.7 percent at $296,000), Norway (0.2 to 1.3 
percent, the latter at $47,000), Spain (0.2 to 2.0 percent, the top rate at $7.1 mil-
lion), Sweden (1.5 percent initially, reaching 3.0 percent at $140,000), and Swit-
zerland (0.05 percent, rising to 0.3 percent at $334,000).5 
Countries also varied in the forms of wealth that were included in the tax base. All 
the countries except Spain exempted household and personal effects. Most included 
the value of jewelry above a certain amount. All except Germany included the 
value of automobiles, and all included boats.
Several countries exempted savings accounts up to a certain level ($4,600 in 
Germany, for example). All excluded pension rights and pension-type annuities. 
Other forms of annuities were generally exempt. About half the countries 
exempted life insurance policies, while the other half included some portion of 
them in the tax base.
Owner-occupied housing was taxable in all eleven countries. However, in Austria 
and Finland, a small deduction was allowed, while in the Netherlands and Norway 
housing was valued at only a small percentage of its actual market value. Other 
forms of wealth, including bonds, stocks and shares, and unincorporated busi-
nesses were included in the tax base in all countries.6 
Most countries required an annual reassessment of the total value of personal 
property. However, Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg reassessed every three 
years and Switzerland every two years. In principle, all eleven countries with a 
wealth tax system based the valuation of assets on current market value. However, 
in practice, this procedure was not always easy to enforce. First, some assets were 
not traded in the open market and hence did not have a readily available market 
price (small businesses and unquoted shares, for example). Second, housing pre-
sented a particular problem, since the usual method, based on the sale of “similar” 
property, depended in large measure on the definition of the similar class. On the 
other hand, bonds, quoted shares and stocks, and bank accounts were rather 
straightforward in their valuation.
Most countries used an “asset basis” to value unincorporated businesses, defined 
as the sum of the value of the individual assets contained in the business. This 
5 In Switzerland, the wealth tax was (and is) actually a provincial (canton) tax, so that provisions varied among 
cantons. The example here is based on the Canton of Zurich.
6 There was a technical issue related to debts on excluded assets. Since the wealth tax was based on the total 
value of assets less debts, the appropriate treatment would have been to exclude debts on assets that were 
themselves excluded from the tax base. However, because of the difficulty of assigning specific debts (such 
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159would typically understate the true value of the business, since no additional value 
was given to goodwill. Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands used a market value 
basis (the value of the business if it were sold immediately). Switzerland used a 
formula based on the capitalized value of the business’ profits over time.
Whereas most countries based their valuation of real property on its open market 
value, Austria used a formula based on changes in the average costs of construction 
and changes in land prices. Germany used the assessed valuation for local taxes. 
Luxembourg used a formula based on the capitalized rental value of property. 
Twenty-two of the twenty-four OECD countries had death or gift taxes, or both 
(see Table 1). The only exceptions were Australia and Canada. However, most of 
the OECD countries had “inheritance taxes” in lieu of the American-style estate 
tax. The difference between the two is that inheritance taxes are assessed on the 
recipient, whereas an estate tax is assessed on the estate left by the decedent. With 
an inheritance tax, the tax schedule is applied to each individual bequest, whereas 
with an estate tax, the assessment is on the total value of the transfer. The inherit-
ance tax has certain advantages over the estate tax. First, it can be adjusted more 
closely to the ability of an heir to pay the tax. Second, preferential treatment can 
be accorded to immediate family, as opposed to more distant relatives or friends 
(so-called consanguinity basis).
Of the four countries with estate taxes – Italy, New Zealand, the United King-
dom, and the United States – the tax threshold varied from $20,000 for Italy to 
$600,000 for the United States (in 1985). Marginal tax rates ranged from 3 to 31 
percent in Italy, 30 to 60 percent in the United Kingdom, and 37 to 55 percent in 
the United States. In New Zealand there was a flat rate of 40 percent. Spousal 
transfers were totally exempt in the United States and the United Kingdom but 
were taxed, with special treatment, in the other two countries. All four countries 
also had gift taxes. In Italy and the United States, these were aggregated over the 
person’s lifetime and combined with the estate at death to determine the taxable 
base for the estate tax. 
The structure of inheritance taxes was more complicated. Marginal tax rates var-
ied with the relationship of the heir to the decedent, as did the tax thresholds. In 
France, for example, bequests to spouses had a threshold of $40,000, and the 
marginal tax rates varied from 5 to 40 percent, whereas bequests to non-relatives 
had a threshold of $1,500 with a flat rate of 60 percent applied to the transfer. All 
nineteen OECD countries with an inheritance tax also had an associated gift tax.
Fifteen of the twenty-four OECD countries also provided for a tax on capital gains 
(see Table 1). All fifteen taxed capital gains as they were realized (that is, at time 
of sale). In thirteen of the fifteen countries, capital gains were included as part of 
the personal income tax, whereas in the other two (Denmark and Ireland), a sepa-
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160 Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland – there was both 
a direct wealth tax and a tax on capital gains.
There was wide latitude in the tax treatment of these gains across countries. In the 
United States, long-term capital gains as of 2001 received tax preference, with a 
maximum tax rate of 18 percent. Short-term gains were treated as ordinary income. 
In Denmark, there was a flat rate of 50 percent; while in Switzerland, marginal 
rates ranged from 10 to 40 percent. In neither case was there separate treatment of 
short-term gains.
In Australia, Norway (with some exceptions), and Spain, both short-term and 
long-term gains were treated as ordinary income and taxed in accordance with the 
personal income tax schedule. In Canada, three-quarters of capital gains were 
included as ordinary income. In Japan, half of long-term capital gains were taxed 
as ordinary income, while short-term gains were treated as ordinary income. In 
Sweden, a proportion of long-term gains were taxed as ordinary income, with the 
proportion depending on the nature of the property and the period held, while 
short-term gains were treated as ordinary income.
In most countries with capital gains taxes, gains on principal residences were 
exempt from taxation. Exceptions were Switzerland, where such gains were fully 
taxable; Japan, where the first $178,000 of gains was exempt; Spain, where the 
exemption was subject to the purchase of a new residence; and Sweden and the 
United States, where only the excess of the sale price over the purchase price of a 
new residence was subject to taxation.
Though on the books, these wealth taxation mechanisms appear to be a formidable 
way of collecting revenue, in fact, such levies accounted for only a very small part 
of total tax revenue in the various OECD countries. The last column of Table 1 
summarizes the total tax collections from direct wealth and death/gift taxes as a 
percent of total government revenue in 1985. Unfortunately, these totals do not 
include capital gains tax, since it was very hard to break out from regular income 
tax receipts. Among the twenty-three countries shown here, the average percent-
age was only 0.67. The shares ranged from a low of 0.01 percent in Australia to a 
high of 3.06 percent in Switzerland. Switzerland was, moreover, the only country 
in which the direct wealth tax collected more than 1 percent of total tax revenue 
– 2.25 percent in 1985. The United States was slightly above average, with 0.77 
percent of its total tax revenue from estate and gift taxes. In terms of the receipts 
from death and gift taxes as a share of the total personal tax intake, the United 
States ranked fifth among OECD countries. In 1998, total federal tax collections 
from estate and gift taxes in the United States amounted to 24.0 billion, or 1.4 
percent of total tax revenues (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2001: 372). 
One may wonder why these wealth taxes collected so little revenue, particularly 
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161time for refinement of their efficacy. Three possible reasons suggest themselves. 
First, particularly in Europe, tax proceeds from the personal income tax and the 
value-added tax on consumption were already quite substantial, so that relative to 
total tax revenues wealth tax collections appeared small. Second, there is the 
strong possibility of evasion or non-criminal avoidance. Unlike labor earnings and 
interest and dividend payments, which can be recorded at their source, it was 
much more difficult for a tax collection agency to obtain independent information 
on financial securities, stock holdings, or the value of a family business.
A third and related reason is that it is easy to transfer financial wealth holdings 
across borders. With the exception of real property and most small businesses, a 
family normally can purchase assets outside the country of residence with ease. A 
country that imposes an excessive wealth tax may induce substantial capital flight. 
As a result, most countries with a wealth tax tried to keep it more or less in line 
with that of other countries.
3 WEALTH TAXATION IN 2015
Almost thirty years have elapsed since the publication of the OECD (1988) report 
on wealth taxation. What was the state of wealth taxation in 2015? This is sum-
marized in Table 2. Of the eleven countries with a direct wealth tax in 1985, only 
four still had one in 2015 – the Netherlands (on the provincial level only), Nor-
way, Spain, and Switzerland (on the canton level). Spain abolished its wealth tax 
on January 1, 2009, but then re-introduced it in 2012. Austria and Denmark dis-
continued their wealth tax in 1995, Germany in 1997, Finland and Luxembourg in 
2006, and Sweden in 2007. Iceland abrogated its wealth tax in 2006, reintroduced 
it in 2010 for four years, and then eliminated it in 2015. However, France reintro-
duced a direct wealth tax in 2011 and abolished it again in 2018, except on high-
value real estate assets.7 As of 2016, three of the original 24 OECD countries had 
a national wealth tax and two had a provincial (or canton-level) wealth tax. 
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162 Table 2
Wealth taxation systems among OECD countries, 2015























United Kingdom no estate
United States no estate
Note: aProvincial (or canton) tax.
Sources: European Commission (2014); Deloitte (2014); OECD (2018) and Cole (2015).
With regard to inheritance, gift, and/or estate taxes, of the 22 countries with one 
form of these in 1985, all but four still had one in effect in 2015. New Zealand 
eliminated its estate duty in 1992. Sweden abolished its inheritance tax in 2005, 
Austria in 2008, and Norway in 2014.
Why the retrenchment in wealth taxes (both direct and inheritance)? One can 
think of the backlash on taxes in general that began with Reagan and Thatcher in 
the 1980s. This was followed by a conservative backlash in continental Europe in 
the 1990s and 2000s. For example, the conservative government elected to power 
in Sweden in the mid-2000s engineered the elimination of both the direct wealth 
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1633.1  SIMULATIONS OF DIRECT WEALTH TAXATION  
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016
This section provides simulation results of the potential revenue effects of the 
Swiss wealth taxation system as applied to U.S. household economic data in 2016. 
These are based on the actual tax code of Switzerland updated to 2016 U.S. dol-
lars. The distinctive characteristics of the Swiss plan are shown in Table 3.8 
Table 3
Details of the direct wealth taxation system of Switzerland, 2016*
Taxpayer type Thresholds ($)
single person 74,000
married couple 121,000












Note: *Based on the Canton of Zurich. The original figures are converted to U.S. dollars on the 
basis of PPP exchange rates and updated to 2016 using the CPI-U.
Source: OECD (1988).
The simulations were performed on the basis of the 2016 U.S. personal income 
tax schedules and the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The procedure 
was as follows. First, I updated the income data, which are for 2015, to 2016 dol-
lars on the basis of the CPI-U (a factor of 1.01465). Second, federal income taxes 
for each household were computed on the basis of the NBER TAXSIM model.9 
After the initial run, the estimation procedure could be calibrated. Total individual 
federal income taxes collected in 2016 amounted to $1,546.1 billion.10 The tax 
estimation used here produced a total tax figure for all households of $1,594.1 
billion, a 3.1 percent discrepancy. The tax estimates were subsequently reduced by 
3.1 percent to align with the actual figure. 
The 2016 SCF is the most recent one currently available. The survey consists of a 
core representative sample combined with a high-income supplement. The first 
8 The “Swiss” wealth tax used in the simulations here is based on the Canton of Zurich (see OECD, 1988: 252).
9 Available at: http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/. 
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164 sample was selected from a standard multi-stage area-probability design. This part 
of the sample was intended to provide good coverage of asset characteristics that 
are broadly distributed, such as home ownership. The second sample, the high-
income supplement, was selected as a so-called “list sample” from statistical 
records (the Individual Tax File) derived from tax data by the Statistics of Income 
(SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This second sample was 
designed to disproportionately select families that were likely to be relatively 
wealthy. About two thirds of the cases come from the representative sample and 
one third from the high-income supplement. As a result, the SCF provides a good 
representation of very wealthy families. It should be noted, however, that by 
design, the SCF excludes the so-called Forbes 400 – a list compiled by Forbes 
Magazine of the 400 richest Americans. However, I shall include data from this 
list in Section 4 below.
The principal wealth concept used here is marketable wealth (or net worth), which 
is defined as the current value of all marketable or fungible assets less the current 
value of debts. Net worth is thus the difference in value between total assets and 
total liabilities. Total assets are defined as the sum of: (1) owner-occupied hous-
ing; (2) other real estate; (3) bank deposits, certificates of deposit, and money 
market accounts; (4) financial securities; (5) life insurance plans; (6) defined con-
tribution pension plans, including IRAs and 401(k) plans; (7) corporate stock and 
mutual funds; (8) unincorporated businesses; and (9) trust funds. Total liabilities 
are the sum of: (1) mortgage debt; (2) consumer debt, including auto loans; and 
(3) other debt such as educational loans.
This measure reflects wealth as a store of value and therefore a source of potential 
consumption. I believe that this is the concept that best reflects the level of well-
being associated with a family’s holdings. Thus, only assets that can be readily 
converted to cash (that is, “fungible” ones) are included. Though the SCF includes 
information on the value of vehicles owned by the household, I exclude this from 
my standard definition of household wealth, since their resale value typically far 
understates the value of their consumption services to the household. The value of 
other consumer durables such as televisions, furniture, household appliances, and 
the like are not included in the SCF.11 Another justification for their exclusion is 
that this treatment is consistent with the national accounts, where purchases of 
vehicles and other consumer durables are counted as expenditures, not savings.
Also excluded here is the value of future Social Security benefits the family may 
receive upon retirement (usually referred to as “Social Security wealth”), as well 
as the value of retirement benefits from defined benefit pension plans (“DB pen-
sion wealth”). Even though these funds are a source of future income to families, 
they are not in their direct control and cannot be marketed. 
11 On the other hand, the value of antiques, jewelry, art objects and other “valuables” are included in the SCF 
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1653.2 REVENUE, INCIDENCE AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
Simulations of wealth taxation suggest that a combined income-wealth taxation 
system might indeed be more equitable than the income tax system alone. The 
wealth tax was, not surprisingly, progressive with respect to wealth. Its incidence 
also fell more heavily on older households than younger ones (older households 
were wealthier, on average), on married couples than singles (the former were also 
richer, on average), and on white individuals than nonwhites (white families were 
generally much wealthier). Although this approach did not take into account 
behavioral responses of families to the imposition of a wealth tax, the calculations 
nonetheless gave some guidance as to the overall magnitude of likely revenues 
and redistribution effects. 
There are three questions of interest. First, how much additional tax revenue 
would be raised under a Swiss-style wealth taxation scheme (revenue effects)? 
Second, which groups would likely bear the burden of the new taxation of wealth 
(incidence effects)? Third, how would a wealth tax affect overall inequality in the 
population and within different demographic groups (distributional effects)?
Following the Swiss convention, thresholds and tax brackets were indexed to con-
sumer price changes. Using the CPI-U, the exemptions in 2016 are $121,242 for 
married couples and $73,611 for singles. The top bracket (the 0.3 percent range) 
begins at $2.4 million. A restriction is now added such that the sum of income and 
wealth taxes cannot exceed total income. 
A Swiss style wealth tax would have generated $182.1 billion in extra tax revenue 
in 2016.12 This represents 1.0 percent of total personal income and 10.5 percent of 
total federal income tax revenue (see Table 4). This figure compares with actual 
U.S. personal income tax proceeds of $1,546.1 billion in 2016, or 9.6 percent of 
total income.13 It also contrasts with total federal estate and gift taxes of about $20 
billion in 2016.14 While 44 percent of families in 2016 would have paid an addi-
tional wealth tax, only 20 percent of families would have seen their tax bill rise by 
more than $200 and only 15.1 percent by more than $500. 
12 It should be noted that in the simulation all assets are appraised at market value (since this is the only val-
uation available).
13 The revenue effect estimated on the basis of the Swiss system (2.2 percent of total U.S. tax revenues) was 
not very far out of line with the actual experience of that country; in 1985, the Swiss wealth tax accounted for 
2.3 percent of total tax revenues in Switzerland. More recent data are not available. 
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166 Table 4
Income tax and wealth taxes modeled after the Swiss system, 2016*
Ratio of income 
tax to family 
income (%)







All families 9.6 1.0 0.10 44.3
A. Income class ($)
Under 15,000  -3.1 2.0 – 14.6
15,000 –  24,999  -3.2 0.4 – 23.7
25,000 –  49,999  1.6 0.2 0.14 32.7
50,000 –  74,999  5.9 0.4 0.06 46.3
75,000 –  99,999  7.6 0.5 0.07 58.2
100,000 – 249,999 11.5 0.9 0.07 77.8
250,000 and over 23.4 2.2 0.10 98.1
B. Wealth class ($)
Under 100,000  4.7 0.0 0.00 3.6
100,000 –   249,999  7.6 0.0 0.01 89.6
250,000 –   499,999  9.1 0.2 0.02 100.0
500,000 –   749,999 10.3 0.7 0.07 100.0
750,000 –   999,999 11.6 0.9 0.08 100.0
1,000,000 – 2,499,999 14.5 1.0 0.07 100.0
2,500,000 – 4,999,999 20.7 2.1 0.10 100.0
5,000,000 and over 25.1 3.8 0.15 100.0
C. Age class
Under 35  5.8 0.2 0.03 13.1
35-54 13.6 0.8 0.06 40.9
55-69 14.7 1.6 0.11 59.4
70 and over 10.0 2.4 0.24 67.7
D. Household type
Married couple 13.4 1.2 0.09 50.4
Males, unmarried 13.6 1.1 0.08 36.3
Females, unmarried  6.8 0.6 0.09 36.1
E. Race or ethnicity
White 13.8 1.3 0.09 52.9
African-American  5.4 0.3 0.05 19.8
Hispanic  5.0 0.3 0.06 20.4
Other 12.4 1.2 0.09 46.8
Note: *Based on the Canton of Zurich.
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2016 SCF. The figures are based on the Swiss tax sched-
ule as spelled out in Table 3 with brackets updated to 2016 dollars on the basis of the CPI-U.
The incidence of wealth taxes depends on the joint distribution of income and 
wealth. If the two were perfectly correlated, then everyone would experience a 
similar proportional increase in taxes (depending on the wealth tax schedule). 
However, income and wealth are not perfectly correlated. There are certain groups, 
such as the elderly, that have large wealth holdings but relatively small income. 
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167little wealth accumulation (the “yuppies”). This new tax may thus shift the burden 
away from young households onto elderly ones. 
The Swiss wealth tax system is generally progressive with respect to income, ris-
ing from 0.4 percent for the second lowest income class to 2.2 percent for the 
highest bracket. The percentage increase in total taxes paid would also be gener-
ally higher for upper-income families than lower-income ones. Moreover, the 
fraction of families paying any wealth tax would rise with income level, from 15 
percent for the lowest income bracket (under $15,000 of income) to 100 percent 
for the highest income class ($250,000 of income and over). The wealth tax is also 
highly progressive with respect to wealth. The only groups that would pay an 
additional 1 percent or more of income in federal taxes are the millionaires. Upper 
wealth families would also see a higher proportionate increase in total federal 
taxes paid. Very few families (only 4 percent) worth less than $100,000 in net 
wealth would pay any wealth taxes, whereas virtually all families above this 
amount would wind up paying some wealth tax. 
In terms of wealth tax incidence by demographic characteristic, the wealth tax 
would fall more heavily on older households than younger ones. Wealth tax rates 
on income would rise monotonically with age group, from 0.2 percent for the 
youngest age group (age 34 and under) to 2.4 percent for the oldest (age 70 and 
over), and wealth taxes as a percentage of income taxes would also increase with 
age, from 3.1 percent for the youngest age group to 24 percent for the oldest. The 
share of families paying a wealth tax would likewise rise with age, from 13 per-
cent for the youngest to 68 percent for the oldest age group.
Under a Swiss wealth tax system, married couples would face a slightly higher tax 
rate than unmarried males, and female households would be taxed at the lowest 
rate. A higher percentage of married couples would pay any wealth tax compared 
to unmarried male householders and unmarried female householders. All three 
groups would see their overall tax bill grow by about the same percentage (between 
8 and 9 percent).
Non-Hispanic white families, on average far better endowed than minority fami-
lies, would have paid considerably higher wealth taxes than blacks or Hispanics. 
The “other” group – mainly, Asian-Americans – would face a similar wealth tax 
burden to whites. Likewise, white and “other” families would have seen their tax 
bill rise proportionately more than the other two minority groups. Whereas 53 per-
cent of white families would pay some wealth tax and 47 percent of others, only 20 
percent of Hispanic and African-American families would be subject to this tax.
One can measure the effect of wealth taxation on inequality in three steps. First, 
figure out the inequality (based on the Gini coefficient) in the distribution of pre-
tax income. Second, calculate the Gini coefficient of after-tax income resulting 
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168 measure for after-tax income resulting from both the income tax and the Swiss 
wealth tax system. The distributional effect of the wealth tax will depend on its 
progressivity with respect to income, its magnitude, and the proportionate increase 
in taxes it generates by income class. 
Among all families, the Gini coefficient for pretax income was 0.574 in 2016, 
while the Gini coefficient for income after income taxes was 0.532 (see Table 5). 
Adding the Swiss wealth tax to the personal income tax results in a further reduc-
tion of the Gini coefficient to only 0.528 (0.004 Gini point difference). The reason 
for this rather minimal effect is mainly the small amount of revenue generated by 
the Swiss-style wealth tax relative to income taxes (10.4 percent).
The distributional effect of the wealth tax systems did show some variation by age 
group, family type, and race. The equalizing effects of the wealth tax exerts greater 
influence within older age groups than younger ones. The reduction in the Gini 
coefficient from adding the wealth tax to the income tax rises systematically with 
age, from 0.001 Gini points for the youngest group to 0.008 points for the oldest. 
The effects are stronger among married couples than unmarried individuals: among 
married couples, the Gini coefficient declines by 0.005 Gini points when wealth 
taxes are added to income taxes, compared to a decline of 0.004 among unmarried 
men and 0.001 among unmarried women. The equalizing effect is also larger 
among white and other (mainly Asian) families (a 0.004-point reduction in the Gini 
coefficient) than among blacks and Hispanics combined (0.001 Gini points).
Table 5
Distributional effects of the Swiss wealth taxation system by age group, family 
type and race (Gini coefficients), 2016*
Age group Family type Race
























0.528 0.406 0.501 0.568 0.528 0.487 0.525 0.403 0.533 0.401
Note: *Based on the Canton of Zurich.
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1693.3 ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TAX BASE
I have been assuming that total net worth is the correct base for a wealth tax. It is 
true that most wealth taxes that have been employed use this (or some small vari-
ant) as the base. However, there are other possibilities which might be fairer or, at 
least, more politically palatable. Table 6 shows the effects of altering the tax base 
on wealth tax collections. The base case is net worth (excluding vehicles). It is 
first of interest to note the concentration of tax collections by socio-economic 
characteristic. The top income class, which comprised 4 percent of all households, 
would account for 66 percent of total wealth taxes, and the top two income classes, 
which amounted to 20 percent of all households, would pay 86 percent of the total 
tax bill. The top wealth class, 1.7 percent of all households, would pay 66 percent 
of all wealth taxes, and the top two, 3.7 percent of households, 80 percent of the 
total taxes. Age class 55-69, 26 percent of all families, would account for 46 per-
cent of wealth taxes. Married couples, 57 percent of all households, would pay 85 
percent of all taxes, and whites, 70 percent of households, would contribute 92 
percent of tax revenues.
Table 6 























All families 182.1 -17.0 -29.9 -3.8 -19.1 9.1
A. Income class ($)    
Under 15,000 3.6 -17.5 -59.0 -0.2  -3.9 1.4
15,000 –  24,999 1.7 -40.8 -20.0 -1.6 -13.7 8.8
25,000 –  49,999 3.7 -47.3  -8.7 -2.3 -22.5 43.6
50,000 –  74,999 6.1 -30.7 -16.4 -3.7 -28.3 35.1
75,000 –  99,999 7.7 -28.9 -16.9 -0.1 -30.8 25.7
100,000 – 249,999 33.1 -22.6 -19.6 -3.8 -30.6 19.7
250,000 and over 107.1 -12.2 -34.8 -4.3 -14.7 2.2
B. Wealth class ($)    
Under 100,000 0.0 -68.5  -2.7 0.0 -44.5 –
100,000 –   249,999 0.8 -71.5  -5.9 -0.4 -37.4 223.8
250,000 –   499,999 2.8 -60.5  -5.8 -1.8 -40.9 123.7
500,000 –   749,999 5.9 -57.9 -10.5 -1.9 -47.9 31.7
750,000 –   999,999 6.0 -40.9 -10.3 -2.4 -42.7 13.6
1,000,000 – 2,499,999 16.6 -23.9 -12.7 -1.7 -32.1 17.2
2,500,000 – 4,999,999 23.7 -25.0 -24.0 -2.1 -28.8 6.0



















































C. Age class    
Under 35 3.0 -12.3 -54.3 -9.5  -5.7 1.4
35-54 47.2 -17.7 -42.9 -3.0 -15.9 4.3
55-69 74.7 -16.9 -25.5 -2.8 -22.2 11.8
70 and over 38.1 -16.8 -20.7 -6.3 -18.1 10.3
D. Household type    
Married couple 138.0 -16.2 -30.3 -3.2 -19.8 8.5
Males, unmarried 14.9 -15.4 -38.0 -5.5 -11.8 7.2
Females, unmarried 10.2 -29.8 -12.8 -9.9 -20.6 19.8
E. Race or ethnicity   
White 150.2 -16.5 -28.8 -4.0 -19.6 8.8
African-American 2.5 -19.0 -46.1 -3.0 -18.5 43.4
Hispanic 2.2 -24.1 -58.2 -2.4  -8.1 6.2
Other 8.1 -24.1 -39.0 -0.3 -13.5 4.8
Memo: Post-income 
and wealth tax Gini 
coeff. for all households
0.528 0.528 0.529 0.528 0.529 0.528
Note: *Based on the Canton of Zurich.
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2016 SCF. See text for details on tax calculations.
I alter the tax base in five ways. First, I exclude principal homes (and the associ-
ated mortgage) from the tax base. One reason for this is that homes are already 
subject to a local property tax. Total wealth tax revenues now fall by 17 percent. 
The lower income and wealth classes would get the most benefit (the largest per-
centage reduction in taxes owed), as would families over age 34, unmarried 
females, and non-whites. However, there is no perceptible effect on the after-
income tax and wealth tax Gini coefficient. 
Second, small businesses could be exempted from the wealth tax since they are 
particularly difficult to value and their inclusion is likely to be opposed by a pow-
erful interest group. This exclusion would cause the total tax bill to fall by 30 
percent. The main beneficiaries would be upper income and wealth households 
(who own most of the businesses), as well as young families and, surprisingly, 
Hispanics. This restriction would result in a slight increase in the post-tax Gini 
coefficient (a 0.0014 change). Third, trust funds might be excluded since they are 
generally excluded from the estate tax base. The overall reduction in the wealth 
tax bill would be tiny, at 3.8 percent. Once again the main beneficiaries would be 
upper income and wealth households, as well as the youngest and oldest age 
group, surprisingly unmarried females, and whites. This change, however, would 
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171Fourth, IRAs, 401(k) plans, and other defined contribution pension plans might be 
eliminated from the tax base, since they are not taxed for income tax purposes. 
Overall, total wealth taxes would decline by 19 percent. The groups that would 
gain the most (that is, experience the greatest reduction in wealth taxes owed) are 
middle income and middle wealth families, age group 55-69, and whites. This 
restriction would cause the after-tax Gini coefficient to rise by a very small 0.0006 
points. Finally, we might add defined benefit pension wealth to the base since this 
is an important component of augmented wealth. This would add 9 percent to the 
wealth tax intake. Middle income families would be hit hardest, as would lower 
wealth families, age groups 55 and over, unmarried females, and African-Ameri-
cans (43 percent increase in wealth taxes). Overall, there is almost no effect on the 
after-tax Gini coefficient. 
4  THE WARREN WEALTH TAX AND EFFECT OF WEALTH TAXES  
ON WEALTH INEQUALITY 
As noted above, Elizabeth Warren proposed a direct tax on household wealth in 
her presidential campaign. The structure is quite straightforward: there is a basic 
exemption of $50 million per family. The bottom bracket is 2 percent up to one 
billion dollars of net worth. The top bracket is 3 percent for one billion or more of 
net worth.
Let us first compare revenue effects. To do this, I first add data from the Forbes 
400. In 2016, the combined wealth of the Forbes 400 is estimated to be $2.4 tril-
lion (Forbes, 2019). Total household wealth in that year for all households is $84.1 
trillion on the basis of the 2016 SCF. Thus, 2.86 percent of total wealth is excluded 
from the SCF. How does the inclusion of the Forbes 400 affect the estimate of 
total wealth tax revenue?
On the basis of the SCF data alone, the Swiss wealth tax would have yielded 
$182.1 billion in 2016. Including the Forbes 400 raises the amount to $189.3 bil-
lion, a rather small 4 percent increase (see figure 1, left-hand panel). The Warren 
wealth tax would have yielded $231.4 billion excluding the Forbes 400 and $303.4 
billion including the Forbes 400. The Forbes 400 alone would have collectively 
paid $72.0 billion, or 23.7 percent of the total tax revenue. Including the Forbes 
400, the ratio of total tax revenue between the Warren tax and the Swiss tax is 
1.60. Another notable difference between the two taxes is their incidence. Whereas 
44.3 percent of all families would be subject to the Swiss wealth tax, only a tiny 
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172 Figure 1
Revenue, incidence and distributional effects of Swiss and Warren wealth taxes
Total tax revenue  
in 2016 including  
the Forbes 400  
(in $ billions, 2016)
Tax incidence:
% of households  
paying a wealth tax
Gini coefficients for 
household wealth in 2016, 











































What about the effect of these taxes on wealth inequality? The Gini coefficient for 
net worth based on the 2016 SCF data alone is 0.8771. The Gini coefficient drops 
to 0.8770 after application of a Swiss wealth tax and to 0.8768 after that of a War-
ren tax. In both cases, the effect is miniscule. When I now include the Forbes 400, 
the Gini coefficient for net worth rises to 0.8830 (Figure 1, right-hand panel). The 
Gini coefficient for net worth net of the Swiss wealth tax now falls by 0.0001 Gini 
points to 0.8828, almost exactly the same decline as before without the Forbes 400 
included. Likewise, the Gini coefficient for net worth net of the Warren wealth tax 
declines by 0.0005 Gini points to 0.8825, also about the same reduction as before 
without the Forbes 400 included.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The pronounced rise in wealth inequality since the early 1980s creates some urgency 
in policy remedies. The most telling statistic is that virtually all the growth in (mar-
ketable) wealth between 1983 and 2016 accrued to the top 20 percent of households 
(see Chapter 2 in Wolff, 2017). Indeed, the bottom 40 percent of households saw 
their wealth decline in absolute terms. This was compounded by the stark reality of 
a growing proportion of households with zero or negative net worth.
What, if anything, should be done about this? If one policy goal is to moderate the 
rising inequality of recent years, direct taxation of wealth is one proposed remedy. 
This would compensate for the reduced progressivity of the income tax system. The 
years since 1980 witnessed falling marginal tax rates on income, particularly for the 
rich and very rich. The top marginal tax rate fell from 70 percent in 1980 to 35 per-
cent in 2012, though it was then raised to 39.6 percent under President Obama. 
What do the simulation results of Section 3 suggest regarding a Swiss-style wealth 
tax? First, the current personal income tax system of this country helps mitigate 
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173wealth tax system would have increased total tax revenues (over and above the 
personal income tax) by only 10 percent in 2016 – too small to have much distri-
butional impact. Third, the wealth tax would have some desirable features from a 
demographic standpoint. It falls proportionately more on older families than 
younger ones; more on married couples than singles; and more on whites and 
Asians than blacks and Hispanics. Moreover, the equalizing effects of the wealth 
tax would be greater among older families, married couples, and whites. 
Fourth, the rather modest Swiss-style system would have yielded an additional 
$189.3 billion of revenue in 2016, including the Forbes 400. However, in 2016 
only 11 percent of families would have seen their federal tax bill rise by more than 
10 percent and only 8 percent would have paid an additional $500 or more of 
taxes. In conclusion, a direct wealth taxation system like Switzerland’s could ease 
the country’s budgetary strains and provide greater equity across generational, 
racial, and familial categories. These characteristics argue in favor of its adoption 
in the United States.
Besides its desirable effects with regard to equity and revenue, are there any other 
characteristics of wealth taxation in its favor? Two other arguments have been 
advanced in support of a wealth tax. First, beyond considerations of overall (“ver-
tical”) equity, some have argued that a wealth tax can be justified in terms of “tax-
able capacity”. Income alone is not a sufficient gauge of well-being or of the 
ability to pay taxes. The possession of wealth, over and above the income it yields 
directly, must be figured into the calculation. Two families with identical incomes 
but different levels of wealth are not equivalent in terms of their well-being, since 
a wealthier family will have more independence, firmer security in times of eco-
nomic stress (such as occasioned by unemployment, illness, or family breakup), 
and readier access to consumer credit. Greater wealth thus confers on the affluent 
family a larger capacity to pay taxes; in the interests of “horizontal equity”, wealth 
should be taxed along with income.
A second argument is that an annual wealth tax may induce individuals to transfer 
their assets from low-yielding to high-yielding investments, in order to offset the 
additional taxes. For example, a wealth tax might induce individuals to seek more 
income-generating assets in place of conspicuous consumer durables such as lux-
ury cars and yachts.
It should be noted, too, that existing wealth taxation in this country works poorly. 
The estate tax has historically been extremely porous. The thresholds have been 
raised over time (from $50,000 in 1916, when the estate tax was first instituted, to 
$5.25 billion for singles and $10.5 billion for couples in 2016), so that only a very 
small percentage of estates (typically on the order of 1 or 2 percent) have been 
subject to estate tax. The threshold is currently indexed to the CPI-U and will 
continue to rise over time. Estate taxes on assets can even today be avoided alto-
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174 amount of wealth to be passed on exempt from taxation before death. Finally, the 
estate tax system has a provision that capital gains on assets are “forgiven” at 
death. This loophole by itself probably more than equals the total revenue col-
lected by the estate tax system.
What are the counterarguments? Perhaps the strongest one is that direct wealth 
taxation will inhibit savings and lower capital investment. One unavoidable impli-
cation of wealth taxation is that the (after-tax) return to capital will be lowered. By 
exerting a strong disincentive on the already low U.S. savings rate, it may simply 
encourage increased consumption. Another possibility is that a wealth tax, by 
lowering the after-tax rate of return on financial assets, may encourage families to 
invest in nonfinancial assets, such as certain forms of real estate, collectibles, 
luxury items, and the like. The search for greater opacity to thwart the IRS could 
perversely result in household portfolios being shifted to unproductive uses; 
though, as suggested above, one can reasonably argue the opposite case – that tax-
ing both income-yielding and non-income-yielding forms of wealth will induce 
households to shift to higher-yielding assets.
A second potential problem stemming from a wealth tax is capital flight. This 
argument applies to every tax, however, and if capital indeed moved like quicksil-
ver, it would render any taxation of capital and wealth all but impossible. The very 
fact that the wealth tax proposal presented above is based on the Swiss model 
suggests that capital flight is unlikely to be a serious concern. Like Switzerland, 
the United States is a safe haven for international wealth, a status unlikely to be 
threatened by the very low wealth tax rates suggested here.15
The time is now ripe for the introduction of a personal tax on wealth holdings. The 
statistics point to an enormous degree of inequality in household net worth in this 
country today. On the grounds of (horizontal) equity, a combination of annual 
income and the current stock of wealth provides a better gauge of the ability to pay 
taxes than income alone. Moreover, such a tax may induce a more efficient alloca-
tion of household wealth, toward more productive uses. 
What about the additional administrative burdens such a tax might create for fam-
ilies and the IRS? The wealth tax would be fully integrated with the personal 
income tax. The same tax form could be used for both. The family would be 
required to list the value of all assets and debts on a new subsidiary form (say, 
“Schedule W”). Verification of most of the assets and debts would be administra-
tively easy to implement. Insofar as banks and other financial institutions provide 
records that list interest and dividend payments (Form 1099) to the IRS, such doc-
uments could be modified to include the value of the accounts as of a certain date 
(say, December 31). Moreover, financial institutions that provide the IRS with 
information on mortgage payments could now add the value of the outstanding 
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175mortgage. Other types of loans (and loan payments) could be similarly recorded by 
these institutions. Insurance companies could provide the IRS with statements on 
the value of life insurance equity (they already send these to individuals). 
The two main stumbling blocks are the current market value of owner-occupied 
housing (and other real estate) and the valuation of unincorporated businesses. For 
the former, there are several possible solutions, some of which are currently in use 
in other countries. The family could be asked to estimate the current market value 
(as is now done in household surveys). Alternatively, it could be asked to list the 
original purchase price and date of purchase, and the IRS could use a regional (or 
locale-specific) price index based on housing survey data to update the value. 
Another method would ask residents to provide the figure for assessed valuation 
of the property, and the IRS could provide a locale-specific adjustment factor, 
based on periodic survey data, to estimate current market value.
For unincorporated businesses, the simplest technique is to accumulate the value 
of individual assets invested in the business over time (these figures are already 
provided in Form C of the personal tax return). Another possibility is to capitalize 
the net profit figures (also provided on Form C), as the Swiss currently do. 
Thus, for almost all families, record-keeping for the wealth tax will be fairly 
straightforward. For the very rich, with complex portfolios, there will be addi-
tional burdens on record-keeping but almost all such families already pay account-
ants to handle such tax matters.
On the administrative side, there will be additional costs incurred by the IRS to 
administer such a (new) tax. However, one saving grace is that the IRS does not 
have to re-invent the wheel. Most of the “machinery” is now in place since many 
of the procedures needed by the IRS to value asset holdings already exist for the 
federal estate tax and the estate tax code has been around for over 100 years. 
Another concern is the extent to which a universal system of monitoring the assets 
of the entire population is acceptable to a liberal economy such as the United 
States in comparison to European economies and their citizens, who are more 
accustomed to greater control and influence by the state in society. However, it is 
not clear that a wealth tax will be viewed as any more intrusive than an income 
tax, which has also been in use in the United States for over 100 years. Also, as 
noted above the federal estate tax has also been around for over a century and this 
tax also entails a fairly extensive accounting of individual wealth holdings.
One might also consider some of the behavioral response of individuals and fam-
ilies to the imposition of a wealth tax.16 First, there is the initial shock at the time 
of introduction of the tax. If the wealth tax is not anticipated, current holders of 
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176 assets may be forced to sell some of their assets at a discount in order to pay the 
wealth tax, particularly those people that have disproportionately high value assets 
compared to their current income. If so, they may be forced to sell the property at 
a (significantly) lower price than current market value, which means that a note-
worthy portion of future taxes will be shifted (transferred) to the current owner of 
that property. As a result, current owners may bear the additional burden of the 
future owner-taxpayers after the price adjustment. 
Second, as noted above, a wealth tax system opens the possibility (or at least 
induces) that existing properties be transferred to more productive uses – for 
example, to buy shares or stocks or to invest in entrepreneurial activity. However, 
this consideration neglects the government’s ability to tax only the registered part 
of the property (savings in banks, stocks, real estate, vehicles, vessels, and so on). 
Available assets can be transformed into other forms (for example, artwork or 
jewelry) that are not likely to be taxed because the government does not keep 
records of their purchase. Moreover, as with an estate tax, the wealth tax could 
also be avoided through the establishment of trusts and even foundations. 
Third, as I noted above, there are problems of identifying and continuously updat-
ing the value of the various assets held by a family, particularly real property and 
small businesses. What would be the impact of these difficulties on the fairness (or 
equality) of such taxes on taxpayers? Some taxpayers will avoid significant tax 
obligation either because of successful concealment of their assets or because of 
the inability of the tax administration to value them properly, while others may not 
be able to prove that their property is worth less than the tax administration esti-
mates. Above, I suggested some solutions to these difficulties as used by other 
countries. The IRS likewise confronts many of these issues when auditing estate 
tax returns. Nonetheless, these difficulties may make many taxpayers feel that the 
wealth tax is unfair.
Despite these concerns, a wealth tax may make a lot of sense as an additional fiscal 
tool. If so, calculations show that a Swiss-based tax structure would yield an aver-
age tax rate on household wealth (as of 2016) of only 0.19 percent. Previous work 
indicates that the annual real rate of return on household wealth over the period 
from 1983 to 2016 averaged 3.1 percent per year (see Chapter 3 in Wolff, 2017). 
Thus, the new tax regime would reduce the average yield on household assets by 
only 6.2 percent. Even the top marginal tax rate of 0.3 percent would reduce the 
average yield on personal wealth by only 9.7 percent. These figures suggest that 
disincentive effects, if any, on personal savings would be very modest.
The proposed wealth tax would affect a very small percentage of the population. 
Only 11 percent of American families would see their overall personal tax bill 
(combining income and wealth taxes) rise by more than 10 percent. Only 15 per-
cent would pay $500 or more of additional taxes. A full 56 percent would fall 
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177A substantial $189 billion would have been raised from levying such a tax in 2016. 
This is not a large amount, representing 5.8 percent of total federal tax receipts. 
However, on the margin such additional revenue could be critical. A direct annual 
tax on personal wealth could thus be a valuable addition to the fiscal toolbox. 
The proposed Warren wealth tax would raise more tax revenue than the Swiss tax 
– $303.4 billion versus $189.3 billion. Moreover, only 0.07 percent of American 
households would pay any wealth tax, compared to 44.3 percent with the Swiss 
tax. How do the Swiss and the Warren wealth tax affect overall wealth inequality? 
On the basis of the Gini coefficient, there would be virtually no impact from either 
tax. Of course, the Gini coefficient by construction is not very sensitive to changes 
in the upper tail of the wealth distribution, particularly the very upper tail. It is 
much more sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution. However, the 
main reason is that neither tax produces much tax revenue relative to total house-
hold wealth. So, if one objective of a wealth tax is to substantially reduce wealth 
inequality, neither of these taxes will make much of a dent in the high degree of 
wealth concentration.
One other point of comparison is with regard to the top marginal tax rate. The top 
marginal tax rate for the Swiss tax is 0.3 percent in comparison to 3 percent for the 
Warren tax. As argued above, the top Swiss tax rate is not likely to induce much if 
any capital flight. However, the top rate for the Warren tax would reduce the after-
tax rate of return on investments by 97 percent if top households received the 
average real rate of return of 3.1 percent per year on household wealth. This might 
be viewed by many very rich households as “confiscatory” and would be likely to 
induce considerable capital flight.
Disclosure statement 
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